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THE NEXT GENERATION OF SEXUAL CONDUCT:
EXPANDING THE PROTECTIVE REACH OF RAPE
SHIELD LAWS TO INCLUDE EVIDENCE FOUND

ON MYSPACE
The crime of rape has a long history in American jurisprudence.'
Rape shield laws, however, are comparatively new and less tried by the test
of time.2 Though rape shield laws differ in detail across jurisdictions, their
collective premise is to restrict admissibility of the sexual conduct of rape
victims. 3 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the majority of states enacted rape shield statutes, the term "sexual conduct" labeled a rape victim's
history of unchaste behavior.4 Thus, the original connotation of sexual

1 See State v. George, 1 Del. Cas. 161, *1-2 (1797) (allowing a slave's master to testify on
slave's behalf in trial regarding "offense of a rape"); Monroe v. Maples, I Root 422, * 1 (1792)
(referring to "rape" in a description of complaint). See generally Commonwealth v. City of Roxbury, 75 Mass. (9 Gray) 451 (1857) (discussing American revival of English laws that criminalized act of rape); Definition of Indictable Crimes, 2 Del. Cas. 235, * 1 (1797) (defining indictable
crime of rape as "the unlawful carnal knowledge had of the body of a woman by force and against
her will, or without force if under the age often years").
2 See Winfield v. Commonwealth, 301 S.E.2d 15, 16 (Va. 1983) (citing examination of evidence under state rape shield law as "case of first impression"); State v. Ball, 262 N.W.2d 278,
279 (Iowa 1978) (referring to review of state rape shield law as "matter of first impression").
3 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412 (deeming evidence inadmissible if offered to prove "alleged
victim engaged in other sexual behavior" or "alleged victim's sexual predisposition," with exception); ALA. R. EVID. 412 (stating that "evidence relating to the past sexual behavior of the complaining witness . . . shall not be admissible . . . except as otherwise provided in this rule.");

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 21B (2000) (asserting restrictions on admissibility of "evidence of
the reputation of a victim's sexual conduct" and "specific instances of a victim's sexual conduct"
within context of various sex crime cases). This Note will refer to rape cases, yet many rape
shield laws apply to a range of sex crimes that include, but are not limited to, rape. See, e.g.,
ALA. R. EvID. 412 (applying, non-exclusively, to "rape, sodomy, sexual misconduct, sexual
abuse or carnal knowledge"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3508 (1998) (applying to "any degree of
rape, unlawful sexual intercourse, unlawful sexual penetration or unlawful sexual contact; an attempt to commit any degree of rape, unlawful sexual intercourse, unlawful sexual penetration or
unlawful sexual contact" and other sex crimes); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-7 (1998) (applying,
non-exclusively, to "predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, criminal sexual abuse, or criminal transmission of HIV ...").
4 See, e.g., Crawford v. State, 492 S.W.2d 900, 901 (Ark. 1973) (reviewing admissibility of
prosecuting witness's chastity regarding alleged rape); Woodruff v. State, 101 N.W. 1114, 1118
(Neb. 1904) (discussing admissibility of evidence pertaining to alleged rape victim's chastity);
Wright v. State, I S.W.2d 1095, 1096 (Tex. Crim. App. 1928) (discussing defendant's burden to
prove doubt as to prosecuting witness's chastity within rape context); see infra notes 53-57 and
accompanying text (discussing enactment of most state rape shield statutes in 1970s and 1980s).
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conduct was limited to sexual intercourse.5 Through the years this definition broadened as attorneys sought rape shield protection for alternative
sexual behaviors.6 Initially, the meaning expanded slightly to include
physical, sexual acts other than sexual intercourse.7 Yet evolving social
norms begged to further stretch the definition.8
Currently, the wild popularity of online social networking will
again force courts to contemplate the meaning of sexual conduct. 9 Online
social networking has become the modern bedrock of interpersonal communication, often replacing hand-written, telephonic, and even face-to-face
exchanges.' 0 MySpace.com (MySpace) is one of the largest and most
popular servers of this contemporary trend." A combination of comprehensive technology and lenient regulations make MySpace a forum of relatively boundless self-expression, which has resulted in rampant exhibition
of sexual behavior.1 2 Consequently, existing interpretations of sexual conduct must be updated to include sexual conduct found on MySpace.
This note will examine the term "sexual conduct" as it is used
within rape shield laws and suggest a reformed definition in view of modem behaviors found on MySpace.' 3 Following this introduction, Part II
will discuss the short and dramatic history of MySpace. Part III will review the history of rape shield laws by way of founding goals and cross-

5 See Merriam-Webster's

Online Dictionary, Definition of Chastity, http://www.mw.com/dictionary/chastity (last visited Mar. 26, 2008) (defining chastity as "abstention from
unlawful sexual intercourse" or "abstention from all sexual intercourse").
6 See infra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (listing forms of sexual conduct other than sexual intercourse that were discussed within the rape shield context).
7 See State v. Sheline, 955 S.W.2d 42, 46-47 (Tenn. 1997) (holding state rape shield law
governed evidence of victim's prior act of oral intercourse).
8 See, e.g., State v. Detonancour, 34 P.3d 487, 491 (Mont. 2001) (rejecting "lingering
touches [and] smoldering glances" under definition of sexual conduct); People v. Wilhelm, 476
N.W.2d 753, 757-58 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (considering whether indecent exposure constitutes
sexual conduct).
9 See Donald Carrington Davis, MySpace Isn't Your Space: Expanding the Fair Credit Reporting Act to Ensure Accountabilit , and Fairness in Employer Searches of Online Social Networking Services, 16 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 237, 238-39 (2006-2007) (discussing popularity of
online social networking services that have in turn impacted social communication).
1o See intra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (describing ways MySpace users can communicate through MySpace profiles).
Ii MySpace Homepage, http://myspace.com/, (last visited Apr. 8, 2008).
12 See intra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (describing sexual behaviors exhibited on
MySpace profiles).
13 For the purposes of this Note, the term "past sexual conduct" will refer to the provisions of
all rape shield laws, although other like terms are used synonymously in differing jurisdictions.
Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3 (1995) (referring to "past sexual behavior"), with KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-3525 (1995) (referring to "previous sexual conduct"), and FLA. STAT. § 794.022
(2000) (referring to "prior consensual sexual activity").
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jurisdictional commonalities. Part IV will examine evolving characterizations of sexual conduct and scrutinize the existing and disparate definitions.
Part V will forecast classification of behavior found on MySpace. In conclusion, Part VI will suggest the need for a comprehensive definition of
sexual conduct that includes behavior found on MySpace and like environments. As MySpace changes the classic understanding of sexual conduct, courts and legislatures alike will be forced to refine ineffective definitions and make room for the next generation of sexual conduct.
I. HISTORY OF MYSPACE
A. MySpace Popularizes Online Social Networking
Over the past two decades, online social networking has become a
universal phenomenon. 4 In the 1990s, Classmates.com and Evite.com
paved the way as some of the first providers of online social networking
services.' 5 These pioneers provided a simple cyber forum and facilitated
online connections amongst users. 16 Friendster.com materialized in 2002
and gave users elaborate, new technology to forge a greater number of
more intimate connections. 17 A few months later, MySpace landed on the
scene and influenced communication more8 extensively than any other preexisting online social-networking service.'

14

See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Land o] Linkedin, 22 CBA REC. (Chicago Bar Ass'n,

Chicago, 111.)Jan., 2008, at 48 (defining online social networking as connecting individuals with
like interests or needs within an online forum).
15 Classmates, About Us, http://www.classmates.com/cmo/about/index.jsp (last visited Apr.
8, 2008) (maintaining origin of Classmates website in 1995); Evite, About Us,
http://www.evite.com/pages/gt/about.jsp (last visited Apr. 8, 2008) (noting Evite website
launched in 1998).
16 See Classmates Homepage, http://classmates.com/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2008) (facilitating
online connections, often in form of reunions between school classmates); Evite Homepage,
http://www.evite.com/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2008) (describing purpose and capability of Evite.com
to facilitate social connections and party planning). See generally Ebrahim Ezzy, Social Networking:
Time for
a Silver Bullet,
READ
WRITE
WEB,
Oct.
4,
2006,
http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/social networking silver bullet.php (last visited Apr. 8,
2008) (presenting history of online social networking hubs).
17 See Friendster Homepage, http://www.friendster.com/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2008) (describing Friendster amenities and ways to join).
18 MySpace Homepage, http://myspace.com/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2008). See generally
Patricia
Sellers,
MvSpace
Cowbovs,
CNN,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune -archive/2006/09/04/8384727/index.htm
(last
visited Apr. 8, 2008) (describing history of MySpace). Founders of MySpace, Tom Anderson
and Chris DeWolfe, put their MySpace idea into action in October 2003. Id. Initially, however,
MySpace was active to only a confined population of the founders themselves and a small group
of their friends. Id. By the start of 2004, Anderson and DeWolfe officially launched the publicly
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MySpace grew into a multi-million dollar business in a mere eighteen months by transforming online social-networking from an innovative
tool to an everyday essential. 19 Since January 2007, three years after its official public launch, MySpace has maintained a rank in the top ten most
heavily visited websites in the United States. 20 The intense popularity of
MySpace has led to a culture in which users replace traditional forms of
communication with MySpace facilitated communication. 2 ' Beyond social
application, MySpace facilities serve a range of users and purposes such as

background checks for employment recruiters and free promotion for ama22
teur musicians.
The foundation of MySpace is user profiles. 23 Upon registering for
MySpace, a new user receives a blank webpage to post personally selected
information. 4 The term "post" defines the act of electronically attaching
content, such as text, photos, videos and sounds, from a user's computer
hard drive onto his or her online profile.25 The end result is an intimate

accessible version of MySpace. Id.
19 Sellers, supra note 18 (describing Rupert Murdoch's purchase of Intermix Media, parent
company of MySpace, for $580 million dollars).
20 See
Alexa,
Traffic
History

Graph

for

MySpace.com,

http://www.alexa.comI/data/details/traffic-details/myspace.com (last visited Apr. 8, 2008) (showing consistent MySpace rank in top ten websites with highest website traffic from approximately
beginning of 2006 through present time); see also Martin H. Bosworth, What's Inside
8,
2005,
MySpace.com?,
CONSUMER
AFFAIRS,
Apr.
(last visited Apr. 8,
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/newsO4/2006/03/myspaceinside.html
2008) (stating "one industry poll claimed that MySpace had 12 billion unique page views in Oct.
2005, twice that of Google's 6.6 billion").
21 See Ryan Lex, Can MySpace Turn Into My Lawsuit?: The Application of Defamation Law
to Online Social Networks, 28 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 47, 47-48 (2007) (discussing intense popularity of MySpace and varied ways to communicate through its facilities).
22 See Westlaw LawPrac Index, Cyber-Recruiting: Why Trouble May Be Just One Mouse
Click Away, I COMPENSATION & BENEFITS FOR L. OFFS. 1 (2007) (conferring trend among hiring professionals to view MySpace profile of potential employees); Robert Sprague, Googling
Job Applicants: IncorporatingPersonal Information into Hiring Decisions, 23 LAB. LAW. 19,
36-37 (2007) (discussing company recruiters search of online social networking websites for information on job candidates); see also Alon Rotem, Legitimizing Pay to Play: Marketizing Radio
Content Through a Responsive Auction Mechanism, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 129, 151 (2007) (discussing participation of music label artists in MySpace craze); Matt Krantz, The Guys Behind
USA
TODAY,
Feb.
12,
2006,
MySpace.com,
http://usatoday.com/money/companies/management/2006-02-12-myspace-usatx.htm (last visited
Apr. 8, 2008) (reporting on effect of MySpace on musicians and music industry).
23 See J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 307CV585, 2007 WL 954245 at *1 (M.D. Pa.
Mar. 29, 2007) (describing function of MySpace facilitated by user profiles).
24 MySpace, About Us, http://www.myspace.com/Modules/Common/Pages/AboutUs.aspx
(last visited Apr. 8, 2008) (describing MySpace user profiles: "Your profile is Your Space on the
Web, where you can describe yourself, hobbies and interests. You can even upload pics and write
journals.").
25 See Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, Definition of Post, http://www.m-
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26
bulletin board of handpicked words, images and sounds.

B. MvSpace Use Turns Provocative
In addition to ground-breaking technology, MySpace encompasses
a distinct laissez-faire attitude thanks to the originating intentions of its
founders. 27 Given their aversion to rules and regulations, MySpace founders Tom Anderson and Chris DeWolfe deliberately created MySpace as
an "open" website where users could freely express themselves. 28 While
certain profile content is prohibited, MySpace's Terms and Conditions ex29
pressly state that MySpace "is not responsible or liable for content."
Thus enforcement of acceptable content is implicitly left to parents, teach-

ers, users themselves, or, perhaps, to no one.30
This uninhibited environment combined with evolving standards of
social expression has evoked provocative usage.3 1 Many MySpace profiles
are riddled with vulgar language, and drug and alcohol illustratives.32 Sexw.com/dictionary/posting (last visited Apr. 8, 2008) (defining term "post" as verb that means to
"publish (as a message) in an online forum (as an electronic bulletin board)"); Marcelo Halpem,
User Generated Content-Key Issues, 901 PLI/Pat 203, 218 (2007) (defining "posting" in the
MySpace forum as "displaying or publishing.. .any content on or through the MySpace Services..."); see also MySpace, Frequently Asked Questions about Profile Design,
http://www.myspace.com/ (follow "FAQ" hyperlink; then follow "How do I add color, graphics,
& sounds to my Profile page?" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 26, 2008) (describing procedure of
designing MySpace profile).
26 See Janet Komblum, Teens Hang Out at MySpace, USA TODAY, Jan. 8, 2006,
http://usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-01-08-myspace-teensx.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2008) (describing ways MySpace users decorate their profiles to portray their personality).
27 See Sellers, supra note 18 (describing "laid-back, anti-authority vibe" of MySpace founders and MySpace itself).
28 See Sellers, supra note 18 (quoting MySpace founders' goal to build an "open" forum).
29 MySpace, Terms and Conditions, http://www.myspace.com/ (follow "Terms" hyperlink)
(last visited Mar. 26, 2008) (presenting lengthy terms and conditions of MySpace usage).
30 Id; see also MySpace, Frequently Asked Questions about Abuse Reporting,
http://www.myspace.com! (follow "FAQ" hyperlink; then follow "35. Where do I Report Abuse
and Inappropriate Content?" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 8, 2008) (noting MySpace ability to report perceived abuses, including identity fraud, spammers, copyright infringement, harassment
and inappropriate profile content); MySpace, Frequently Asked Questions about Profile Privacy
Settings, http://www.myspace.com/ (follow "FAQ" hyperlink; then follow "39. How do I set my
profile to private?" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 8, 2008) (describing process of setting MySpace
profile to private and thereby limiting public viewership).
31 See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (exemplifying provocative ways that users
express themselves through their MySpace profiles).
32 See David Narkiewicz, The Dangers of MySpace. Facebook and YouTube, 30 PA. LAW.
(Pa. Bar Ass'n) Feb., 2008 at 56, 57 (noting MySpace user that posted "'sex, drugs and rock and
roll' on list of interests); Robert Sprague, Googling Job Applicants: IncorporatingPersonal
Information Into Hiring Decisions, 23 LAB. LAW 19, 36-37 (2007) (discussing employment recruiters discovery of potential candidates "risqu6 'photographs and provocative comments about
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ual expressions, such as racy photographs and depictions of sexual exploits,
are also epidemic. 33 The slang term "MySpace Whores" was coined to describe users that post sexually charged content on their profiles. 34 Taking
advantage of the enormous public audience available through MySpace,
some users intentionally use sexual behavior to seek attention. 35 Tila
Nguyen, stage name Tila Tequila, launched herself to celebrity status much
to the thanks of her provocative MySpace profile.36 Known for her sexual
photographs and videos and unfiltered self-expression,
Tila's profile exists
37
MySpace.
on
viewed
most
the
of
one
as
In 2006, the judicial branch saw its first case in which the basis for
complaint was an individual's MySpace profile. 38 Numerous cases have
drinking recreational drug use and sexual exploits'..." posted on online social networking websites).
33 See. e.g., Mike Celizic, Ousted Mayor Makes No Apologies for Lingerie Photos,
MSNBC.com, Mar. 3, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23445683/ (reporting unregretful
attitude of mayor stripped of office due to sexual photographs she posted on MySpace); Jane
Gordon, MvSpace Draws a Questionable Crowd, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 26, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/26/nyregion/nyregionspecial2/26ctspace.html?scp=2&sq=mysp
ace+and+sexual+content&st=nyt (referring to incident of pornographic photos of thirteen year
old girl posted on MySpace);
MySpace,
Daughter",
Profile of "Promiscuous
http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendlD=4446450 (showing
profile of MySpace user "Promiscuous Daughter"); MySpace, Profile of "Sex",
http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=798578 (last visited
Apr. 8, 2008) (presenting profile of MySpace user "Sex").
34 Urban
Dictionary,
Definition
of
MySpace
Whores
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?termn=myspace+whores (last visited Apr. 8, 2008)
(defining "MySpace Whores" as "any girl who appears on MySpace with a.) spread legs b.) ass
hanging out c.) more than I square meter of fake-tan skin showing or d.) appear in a
thong/bustier/garter belt/black lace/teddy/etc."); see also Urban Dictionary, Definition of
MySpace Slut, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=myspace+slut (last visited Apr.
8, 2008) (defining "MySpace Slut").
35 See Usha Munukutla-Parker, Unsolicited Commercial E-mail, Privacy Concerns Related
to Social Network Service, Online Protectionof Children, and Cyherbullying,2 J.L. & POL'Y for
INFO SOC'Y 627, 637-38 (2006) (discussing MySpace users, such as "amateur bands and
would-be porn stars" seeking attention through profiles).
36 Lev
Grossman,
Tila
Tequila,
TIME
MAGAZINE,
Dec.
16,
2006,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1570728,00.html
(discussing Tila Tequila
biography and impact of MySpace on her celebrity status).
37 Id. (quoting Tila Tequila, "'There's a million hot naked chicks on the Internet,' she says.
'There's a difference between those girls and me. Those chicks don't talk back to you."'); see
also MySpace.com, Profile of "Tila Tequila", http://www.myspace.com/tilatequila (last visited
Apr. 8, 2008) (presenting MySpace profile of Tila Tequila).
38 See Layshock ex. rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 412 F. Supp. 2d 502, 508-09
(W.D. Pa. 2006) (discussing First Amendment rights regarding content of high school student's
MySpace profile). In Layshock, a student created and posted a parody of his high school principal on his MySpace profile. Id at 504-06. Word of mouth first popularized the spoof, then
brought grounds for school administered disciplinary actions that included a ten day out-of-school
suspension. Id. In response to punishment, the student filed a lawsuit against the school for violating his First Amendment rights and requested a temporary restraining order to prevent further
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followed, many presenting novel ways in which MySpace impacts communication, self-expression, and, subsequently, the law.39 In some extreme
instances of exploitation, MySpace has facilitated communication between
sexual predators and under-aged youth,40 which has produced in-person
meetings and subsequent heinous crimes.
As a result of the increased impact of MySpace on the legal world,
courts have already begun to develop a framework for utilizing electronic
evidence in the courtroom. 4 1 Evidence found on MySpace is treated within
this framework. 42 Like all evidence, electronic evidence must satisfy preliminary evidentiary concerns, including hearsay, authentication, demonstration of best evidence, and relevancy standards. 43 Once these threshold
reprimand. Id. at 505-06. The Pennsylvania District Court held that no constitutional violation
occurred and denied the plaintiffs request for a temporary restraining order. Id. at 509.
39 See, e.g., A.B. v. State, 863 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind. App. 2007) (analyzing plaintiffs MySpace
message under First Amendment political speech jurisprudence); In re T.T., 228 S.W.3d 312
(Tex. App. 2007) (referencing party's MySpace profile as evidence in parental rights proceeding);
see also John Bradley, MvSpace: Working Your Monkeysphere in a Digital World, 70 TEX. B.J.
33. 34 (2007) (listing range of illegal activities facilitated by MySpace).
40 See Bradley, supra note 39, at 34 (noting sexual predators' manipulation of anonymous
and unregulated MySpace environment); see also Erin Alberty, MySpace Use to FindRape Victims?, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Feb. 29, 2008, http://www.sltrib.comlnews/ci 8403345 (last
visited Apr. 8, 2008) (accounting man alleged to have used MySpace to meet underage girls who
he subsequently raped); Joe Garofoli, Families of Sexually Abused Girls Sue MvSpace, Alleging
Negligence, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Jan. 19, 2007, http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2007/01/19/MNGKTNLHODI.DTL (last visited Apr. 8, 2008) (reporting
on lawsuit claiming MySpace negligent in protecting underage girls sexually abused by individuals they met through MySpace); Boston.com, Man Pleads Guilt to Assaulting Girl He Met on
YvSpace.com,
Jan.
12,
2007,
http://www.boston.com/news/local/connecticut/articles/2007/01/12/manpleadsguiltytoassault
inggirl he met on myspacecom/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2008) (discussing defendant's guilty plea
to sexual assault of 14-year-old girl that he met on MySpace).
41 See J. Shane Givens, Comment, The Admissibility ofElectronic Evidence at Trial: Courtroom Admissibility Standards, 34 CuMB. L. REV. 95, 99-102 (2003) (detailing procedure for admitting electronic evidence at trial). See generally William Decoste, Sender Beware - The Discoverabili , and Admissibility of E-Mail, 2 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 79 (2000) (discussing
judicial process of discovering and admitting evidence found in electronic mail). There are no
federal rules of evidence used exclusively for electronic evidence. See United States v. Ferber,
966 F. Supp. 90, 98-99 (D. Mass. 1997) (applying general federal rules of evidence to admissibility of electronic mail). Rather, electronic and non-electronic evidence are governed by the same
laws. Id.
42 See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 73 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 446, 568-69 (2007) (listing,
non-inclusively, MySpace as electronic media within discussion of hearsay rules and electronic
evidence).
43 See Elizabeth A. Ritvo, Jeffrey P. Hermes & Samantha L. Gerlovin, Online Forums and
Chat Rooms in Deflimation Actions, 24 CoM. LAW 1, 19 (2006) (listing evidentiary concerns
raised by plaintiffs seeking to admit content found on internet). The anonymous environment of
the internet can make authentication of electronic evidence an especially complex problem. Id. at
20-21; see also Givens, supra note 41, at 103-08 (detailing complexity of authenticating electronic evidence).
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issues have been addressed, courts often determine admissibility of electronic evidence by considering equivalent, non-electronic material.44 For
example, when determining admissibility of electronic mail, the court may
analogize to admissibility of non-electronic mail.45 Developing case law in
the field of electronic evidence has allowed the admissibility of electronic
business records, proof of criminal intent by way of online chatroom com46
munication, and confession of wrongdoing through electronic mail.
Some states have gone a step further and specifically include electronic
47
evidence within statutory language or in the nature of the crime itself.
III. UNDERSTANDING RAPE SHIELD LAWS
A. Old Habits Die Quickly - The Seachange of Rape Shield Law
The now infamous case of People v. Abbot,48 an 1838 New York
case, may spur a modem day gasp.4 9 In his Abbot decision, Judge Cowen
rhetorically asked, "And will you not more readily infer assent [to sexual
intercourse] in the practiced Messalina, in loose attire, than in the reserved
and virtuous Lucretia? ' 50 This notorious quote illustrates the historical

view that a rape victim with a reputation for sexual promiscuity is less

44 See Decoste, supra note 41, at 82 (noting courts' historical use of analogy when determining admissibility of electronic evidence).
45 See Decoste, supra note 41, at 82 (exemplifying analogy of electronic evidence to paper
documents, which is used by courts to analyze admissibility of electronic documents).
46 See, e.g., State v. Sorabella, 891 A.2d 897, 912-14 (Conn. 2006) (allowing evidence of
defendant's communication with alleged victim in online chat room to prove intent to communicate with person under sixteen years); State v. Glass, 87 P.3d 302, 305-07 (Idaho Ct. App. 2003)
(finding evidence that defendant initiated online conversations with fourteen year old girl supported intent to commit crime); United States v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. 90, 97-99 (D. Mass. 1997)
(affirming admission of electronic evidence as excited utterance and therefore hearsay exception);
United States v. De Georgia, 420 F.2d 889, 895 (9th Cir. 1969) (Ely, J., concurring) (allowing use
of electronic business records in place of paper business records).
47 See. e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-05.1 (2001) (criminalizing act of luring minors by
computer); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21 (McKinney 1999) (criminalizing intentional computer
communication with minor that "depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse, and which is harmful to minors...").
48 19 Wend. 192 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838) (holding female's chastity is admissible evidence).
49 See GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 287 (George Fisher ed., Foundation Press 2006) (2002)
(referring to Judge Cowen's decision in People v. Abbot as one of the most notorious references
in evidentiary law history); see also Commonwealth v. Murphy, 14 Mass. 387, 387 (1817) (holding female witness may be discredited by presenting evidence that she is prostitute). See generally People v. Abbot, 19 Wend. 192 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838) (holding female's chastity is admissible
evidence).
so Abbot, 19 Wend. at 195. Further inflammatory language of Judge Cowen's decision in
Abbot compares a virgin to a "tenant of the stew." Id.

2008]

RAPE SHIELD LA WS AND MYSPA CE

credible than a virginal rape victim. 51 Not surprisingly, judicial practice at
the time of Judge Cowen's
decision allowed admission of a rape victim's
52
past sexual conduct.
In contrast, current federal and state laws restrict the admissibility
of a victim's past sexual conduct during a rape trial. 53 The term rape shield
law came to entitle these type laws, though legal application affects victims
of many sex crimes in addition to rape. 54 In 1974, Michigan became the
first jurisdiction to enact a rape shield law.55 The federal government and
remaining forty nine states followed, most within several years. 56 Arizona
was the last state to enact a rape shield statute in 1998, though rape shield
protection existed there through case law doctrine since 1976.57 After more

51 Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexualit' , License: Sexual Consent
and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 52-53 (2002) (describing historical
view of connection between chastity and propensity to lie about sexual conduct).
52 See supra note 49-51 and accompanying text (showing that prior case law allowed victim's chaste behavior or prostitution to go to her credibility in a courtroom).
53 See Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 764-77 (1986) (reviewing history of rape
law and rape law reform). The admissibility of evidence of a victim's unchaste character remained widely accepted common law doctrine until the late 1970's and early 1980's when rape
shield laws swept across the United States. Id.at 765. The United States Supreme Court has
ruled on rape shield issues three times. See Associated Press v. Dist. Court for the Fifth Judicial
Dist. of Colo., 542 U.S. 1301, 1302-04 (2004) (determining exclusionary power of rape shield
laws in relation to First Amendment); Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 151-53 (1991) (Stevens,
J., Marshall, J., dissenting) (holding rape shield laws are not per se violative of defendants' Sixth
Amendment right); Olden v. Kentucky , 488 U.S. 227, 230-33 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(holding defendants' Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses not violated by prohibition of
certain victim testimony regarding her past sexual conduct).
54 See People v. Bryant, 94 P.3d 624, 629 n.3 (Colo. 2004) (noting "crime formerly described
as rape, from which the rape shield statute obtained its name, is now defined by statute as various
forms of sexual assault.").
55 MICH. COMp. LAWS § 750.520j (1974); see also Anderson, supra note 51, at 81 (noting
Michigan as first jurisdiction to enact rape shield law).
56 See FED. R. EVID. 412. The federal government enacted its first version of federal rape
shield law on October 28, 1978. Id. Amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 412 followed in
1988 and 1994, both of which expanded the Rule's reach. Id.All fifty states of the United States
and the District of Columbia currently have a state statute, state rule of evidence, or both, that
puts forth goals similar to Rule 412. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (2000); IND. CODE §
35-37-4-4 (1998); TEX. R. EVID.412.
57 See State ex rel. Pope v. Superior Court, In and For Mohave County 545 P.2d 946, 952-53
(Ariz. 1976) (overruling State v. Wood, 122 P.2d 416 (Ariz. 1942)) (establishing rape shield law
through case holding); Tracey A. Berry, Prior Untruthful Allegations Under Wisconsin's Rape
Shield Law: Will Those Words Come Back to Haunt You?, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1237, 1247 (2002)
(noting Arizona's application of rape shield law through case law doctrine); see also ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-1421 (1998) (codifying rape shield case law doctrine into Arizona state statute).
But see Anderson, supra note 5 1, at 81 n. 150 (noting that "only Arizona has not passed a rape
shield law of any kind"); Chen Shen, Study: From Attribution and Thought-Process Theory to
Rape-ShieldLaws: The Meanings of Victim's Appearance in Rape Trials, 5 J. L & FAM. STUD.
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than a century of widely accepted propensity reasoning in rape cases, the
entire American judicial system transformed its view in essentially a decade.58
B. Rape Shield Laws Aim to Protect the Rape Victim
The purpose of rape shield laws is multi-sided. 59 The first, and perhaps primary, goal is to prevent propensity reasoning.60 In the context of a
rape case, propensity reasoning infers a victim's consent to the alleged rape
6
because of the victim's consent to past sexual conduct.
' This improper use
• 62
of character evidence creates illogical assumptions."
Rape shield laws also aim to reduce admission of potentially inflammatory evidence.63 Sexual conduct is a socially sensitive topic that
faces divergent moral judgments based upon the critic's principles and the
conduct's nature.64 For instance, a substantial history of unusual sexual

435, 445 n.73 (2003) (noting Arizona as only remaining state without a legislated rape shield law
since 1994 enactment of Utah state rape shield statute).
58 See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text (detailing history of rape shield law enactment that spanned sixteen years, with majority occurring mid-decade).
59 See infra note 61 and accompanying text (describing rape shield goal to prevent reasoning
based on propensity); infra note 63 and accompanying text (describing rape shield goal to prevent
inflammatory evidence from reaching jury); infra note 67 (describing rape shield goal to sustain
trial focus on defendant's alleged crime and not victim's behavior); infra note 70 and accompanying text (describing rape shield goal to protect victim privacy).
60 See supra notes 61-62 (conferring purpose of rape shield laws to limit evidence that shows
propensity of rape victim to consent to sexual conduct).
61 See State v. Sheline, 955 S.W.2d 42, 46 (Tenn. 1997) (discussing rape shield law prevention of "sexist views" that victim's past consent to sexual conduct increases likelihood of victim
consent to sexual conduct with defendant). Rape shield laws emulate, if not reiterate, exclusionary character evidence rules. Galvin, supra note 53, at 778-88 (explaining connection between
rape shield law and general character evidence within rules of evidence).
62 See State v. Garron, 827 A.2d 243, 254 (N.J. 2003) (discussing purpose of New Jersey
rape shield statute as preventing "unscrupulous foraging for character-assassination information
about the victim" and "non-probative [evidence of]private affairs").
63 See Grant v. Demskie, 75 F. Supp. 2d. 201, 210 (1999) (citing Agard v. Portuondo, 117
F.3d 696, 703 (N.Y. 1997)) (noting rape shield laws prevent inflammatory evidence from reaching the jury); Elizabeth J. Kramer, When Men are Victims: Applying Rape Shield Laws to Male
Same-Sex Rape, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 293, 295 (1998) (noting inherent "inflammatory nature" of
victim's past conduct); David Haxton, Rape Shield Statutes: ConstitutionalDespite Unconstitutional Exclusions of Evidence, WIS. L. REV. 1219, 1260 (1985) (discussing inflammatory capacity
of admitting evidence of sexual history).
64 See Cristina Carmody Tilley, A Feminist Repudiation afthe Rape Shield Laws, 51 DRAKE
L. REV. 45, 54-56 (discussing how aim of rape shield advocates relates to quashing "moral overtones" associated with sexual conduct); Paul S. Grobman, The Constitutionalityof Stattorily Restricting Public Access to JudicialProceedings: The Case of/he Rape Shield Mandator , Closure
Provision, 66 B.U. L. REV. 271 (1986) (discussing role of "victim's morality, rather
than.. defendant's innocence or guilt" as centerpiece of rape trials).
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conduct is likely to confront significantly harsher moral judgment than a
modest history of common sexual conduct.65 Rape shield laws provide a
blanket exclusion of all past sexual conduct, regardless of how extensive or
uncommon,
which helps to avoid typecasting, and subsequent condemna66
tion.
Rape shield laws also strive to direct the fact finder's analysis to
case evidence that creates or defeats reasonable doubt of the defendant's
guilt. 67 By excluding evidence that pertains to the victim's past sexual
conduct, the trial can clearly focus on the defendant's conduct as it relates
to the alleged crime. 6' The victim is not on trial in a rape case, nor are the
victim's historical and personal sexual choices.6 9
Lastly, the protection of victim privacy is an overarching goal of
rape shield laws.7 ° Without fear of past sexual conduct finding public
viewership, victims can seek justice against their perpetrators at a lesser
personal cost. 7 1 Protection of complainant privacy in turn encourages the
reporting of rape and ultimately serves the government's interest by aiding
72
the prosecution of rape perpetrators.

6S See Garron, 827 A.2d at 254 (discussing potential for evidence of victim's prior sexual
behavior to stereotype victim as "promiscuous or of low moral character"); Sheline, 955 S.W.2d
at 45 (discussing potential for unfair prejudice against victim when alleged sexual history introduced into evidence).
66 See State v. Higgins, 821 A.2d 964, 971 (N.H. 2003) (quoting State v. Besk, 640 A.2d 775
(N.H. 1994)) (noting rape shield law "makes no distinction among categories of victims").
67 See Sheline, 955 S.W.2d at 44 (noting existence of "two rape trials at the same time" when
victim's prior sexual history is permitted as rape trial's focus); State v. Detonancour, 34 P.3d 487,
491 (discussing purpose of rape shield law to prevent "charge against the defendant being converted into a trial of the victim"); Bryant, 94 P.3d at 629 (noting allowance of victim's past sexual
conduct into evidence places "the victim on trial").
68 See Grobman, supra note 64, at 271 (discussing rape trial focus on victim morality rather
than defendant conduct).
69 See Grobman, supra note 64, at 271 (presenting importance of focusing rape trial on defendant conduct and not victim behavior).
70 See Jason M. Price, Note, Constitutional Law-Sex, Lies and Rape Shield Statutes: The
ConstitutionalitY of Interpreting Rape Shield Statutes to Exclude Evidence Relating to the Victim's Motive to Fahricate, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 541, 561-62 (1996) (discussing rape shield
law protection of victim's privacy interests); Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 153 (1991) (Stevens, Marshall, J.J.,
dissenting) (maintaining rape shield laws provide needed safeguards against
invasion of victims' privacy); Jeffries v. Nix, 912 F.2d 982, 986 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting one of
several rape shield law goals is to protect victims' privacy); Anderson, supra note 51, at 86-94
(explaining rape shield laws exist to protect victim's privacy).
71 See supra note 70 (supporting rape shield goal to protect victim privacy). Many rape
shield statutes have procedural requirements that restrict the discussion of rape shield issues to an
in camerasetting, to further protect the victim's privacy. See, e.g., ALA. R. EVID. 412; GA. CODE
ANN. § 24-2-3 (1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3525 (1995).
72 See Galvin, supra note 53, at 767 (noting belief that rape shield laws would protect victims' privacy, which would increase victims' reporting of sexual crimes); see also Bryant, 94
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C. Applying Rape Shield Laws in Different Jurisdictions
All rape shield laws both limit the admissibility of evidence and
provide exceptions to the limitation.73 It is the span of the overarching
limitation and the magnitude of the exceptions that differentiate individual
rape shield laws.74 For example, the Michigan rape shield law limits the
admissibility of "the victim's sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the victim's sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the victim's sexual conduct" and provides a list of exceptions based on specific, factual instances.75 The California rape shield law contrasts this model by restricting
evidence of the victim's "sexual conduct" when such evidence is offered to
attack the 76
victim's credibility, thereby the exception is built into the limitation itself.
Notwithstanding disparities, the process of employing a rape shield
law at trial follows similar steps in all jurisdictions. 77 First, the evidence in
question must be deemed past sexual conduct because all rape shields are
78
premised on the evidentiary exclusion of a victim's past sexual conduct.
The terms "past" and "sexual conduct" have no universal meaning, thus jurisdiction-specific law and precedent will guide the analysis. 7 9 If evidence

P.3d at 629-30 (discussing impact on sex crime reporting that results from rape shield statutes);
Marah deMeule, Privacv Protections.br the Rape Complainant: Half a Fig Leaf 80 N.D. L.
REV. 145, 148-49 (2004) (discussing goal of rape shield law to increase reporting rates and subsequent prosecution of sex offenders).
73 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (noting underlying use of rape shield laws to restrict, with exception, admissibility of evidence of rape victim's sexual conduct).
74 See Anderson, supra note 51, at 94-97 (categorizing rape shield laws into four groups
based on similarity of application); see infra notes 75-76 (giving examples of Michigan and California rape shield statutes to show general inadmissibility schemes and exceptions to such
schemes).
75 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520j (1991).
76 CAL. EV1D. CODE § 782.
77 See inira note 78 and accompanying text (illustrating preliminary procedural requirement
of determining evidence to be past sexual conduct); see infra note 81 and accompanying text (explaining second procedural requirement of analyzing evidence of past sexual conduct within jurisdiction-specific exceptions to overarching evidentiary limitation).
78 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86f (1994) (referring to victim's "sexual conduct"); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 21B (2000) (referring to "victim's sexual conduct"); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 750.520j (West 1991) (referring to "victim's sexual conduct"); see also State v. Garron,
827 A.2d 243, 260 (N.J. 2003) (reasoning that evidence of victim's flirtatious conduct improperly
characterized as sexual conduct, thus rape shield statute inapplicable); State ex rel Juvenile Dep't
of Jackson County v. Smith, 58 P.3d 823, 836 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting State v. Wright, 776
P.2d 1294 (Or. Ct. App. 1989)) (holding evidence must be past sexual behavior or no further rape
shield inquiry is needed); State v. Muyingo, 15 P.3d. 83, 87 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (citing State v.
Wright, 776 P.2d 1294 (Or. Ct. App. 1989)) (noting first step of rape shield analysis to determine
if evidence is sexual conduct).
79 Compare ALA. R. EVID. 412 (defining explicitly "evidence relating to past sexual behav-
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is determined to be past sexual conduct, the relevant rape shield law governs.8° The evidence is then tested against exceptions to the umbrella rape
shield limitation, which may allow admissibility of the evidence despite
classification as past sexual conduct." In sum, evidence must be classified
as past sexual conduct and fall outside an 82exception in order to be inadmissible under the governing rape shield law.
IV. DEFINING "SEXUAL CONDUCT"
Given the impact of classifying evidence as sexual conduct, the
definition of sexual conduct is pivotal to the outcome of a rape trial. 83 Yet,
few jurisdictions have a clear statutory definition or established case law
interpretation against which to analyze evidence of potential sexual conduct.84 Some jurisdictions cite the term "sexual conduct" within their rape
shield statute, but do not provide a statutory definition of its meaning.85 In

ior" within rape shield law), and GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3 (1995) (defining "past sexual behavior" through direct statutory language), with MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 21B (2000) (providing
no statutory definition of "victim's sexual conduct"), and CAL. EVID. CODE § 782 (giving no
definition of victim's sexual conduct within rape shield statute). See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text (explaining broad interpretation of jurisdictions that define sexual conduct to
include a "willingness to engage" in sexual behavior); supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text
(presenting jurisdictions that interpret past sexual conduct within narrow limitations).
80 See supra note 78 and accompanying text (noting all evidence governed by rape shield law
must first be deemed sexual conduct).
81 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-37-4-4 (1998) (allowing evidence of "victim's pregnancy at time
of trial was not caused by the defendant" as an exception to the Indiana rape shield law's general
restrictions); see also State ex rel Juvenile Dep 't of Jackson Count,, 58 P.2d at 836 (assessing
victim's past sexual conduct within statutory exceptions to Oregon rape shield law). Some rape
shield laws allow, by exception, all evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct with the defendant and other state rape shield laws allow, by exception, evidence of the victim's past sexual
conduct with the defendant only for the purpose of proving consent to the alleged crime. Compare IND. CODE § 35-37-4-4 (1998) (allowing evidence of victim's past sexual conduct with defendant for any purpose), with 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-7 (1998) (allowing evidence of victim's past sexual conduct with defendant only to prove consent).
82 See supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing rape shield laws govern only evidence determined to be sexual conduct); supra note 81 and accompanying text (explaining exceptions that remove rape shield applicability even when preliminary showing of sexual conduct is
present).
83 See Garron, 827 A.2d at 260-61 (reviewing on appeal decision to exclude evidence of victim's prior sexual conduct); supra note 78 and accompanying text (noting all evidence governed
by rape shield law must first be deemed sexual conduct).
84 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (exemplifying jurisdictions that provide no
statutory definition or an unclear statutory definition of sexual conduct); supra notes 86-89 and
accompanying text (exemplifying jurisdictions that have developed confusing and inadequate
case law definitions of sexual conduct).
85 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 21B (2000) (giving no definition of "victim's sexual conduct" through statutory language); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3508 (1998) (placing restric-
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those jurisdictions that provide a statutory definition, it is often broad or
ambiguous.86 The Delaware case of State v. Franklin87 illustrates an obscured interpretation within case law. 8 The Franklin court held that the
term "prior sexual acts" should not be specifically defined, but rather interpreted on a case-by-case basis, without mandatory guidance by case law
doctrine.8 9 Confusion is equally exemplified by the Tennessee rape shield
statute, in which the term "sexual activity" is used to define itself within
the statute. 90
The 1986 case of State v. Carmichael9 waged a direct attack on
the term "sexual conduct. 92 In Carmichaelthe defendant challenged the
constitutionality of the Kansas rape shield statute based on vagueness of the
legislated term "sexual conduct."9 3 The Court reasoned that an average
person could determine the meaning of sexual conduct as used within rape
shield law, and therefore it was not an overly vague term.94 Though the
court did not validate the vagueness claim, Carmichael
highlighted a foun95
dational issue in rape shield law jurisprudence.
Yet, in the decades that followed Carmichael, little clarification
evolved as courts sidestepped the chief problem. 96 Some courts tackled peripheral concepts, such as the meaning of past within the term past sexual

tion on admissibility of"sexual conduct of the complaining witness" without providing definition
of "sexual conduct"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3525 (1995) (giving no definition of "previous sexual conduct" within the statute itself).
86 See ALA. R. EVID. 412 (defining "past sexual behavior" with both very
specific language,
such as "mode of dress" and very broad language, such as "sexual mores contrary to the community standards and opinion of character for those traits"); IND. CODE § 35-37-4-4 (1998) (listing
six varieties of restricted "sexual conduct" evidence without providing clarification on meaning
of term "sexual conduct" itself).
87 855 A.2d 274 (Del. 2004).
88 State v. Franklin, 855 A.2d 274, 279 (Del. 2004) (disempowering case law
doctrine that
interpreted admissibility of prior sexual acts).
X9 Id.
90 TENN. R. EVID. 412 (using redundant language to define "sexual behavior" as "sexual activity of the alleged victim other than the sexual act at issue in the case").
91 727 P.2d 918 (Kan. 1986).
92 State v. Carmichael, 727 P.2d 918, 924-25 (Kan. 1986) (analyzing whether Kansas
rape
shield statute is void for vagueness because the term "sexual conduct" is unclear); see also Young
v. State, 429 So. 2d 1162, 1163 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (denying Alabama rape shield statute
void for vagueness regarding definition of "evidence relating to past sexual behavior.").
93 Carmichael, 727 P.2d at 924 (discussing defendant's argument that state rape shield statute void due to vagueness of term "sexual conduct").
14 Id. at 925.
95 Id.
96 See deMeule, supra note 72, at 162-65 (discussing courts' struggle to comprehensively
define sexual conduct and consistently classify varying evidence of victim behavior).
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conduct.' 7 Other courts circumvented the dilemma by categorically defining particular victim behavior as sexual conduct or not sexual conduct,
rather than defining "sexual conduct" itself.9" For example, a majority of
jurisdictions classified evidence of a victim's contraction of a sexually
transmitted disease as sexual conduct. 99 Conversely, many courts classified
evidence of a victim's prior false accusation of a rape as not sexual conduct.' O
Especially ambitious courts confronted the foundational ambiguity
and revealed improved definitions of sexual conduct. 01' These rare juris-

See Cuyler v. State, 841 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tex. App. 1992) (holding "'past sexual behavior' means sexual behavior that occurs before trial" and not before alleged crime). Several courts
ruled on another secondary issue by defining "conduct," within the term past sexual conduct, as
between voluntary and involuntary behavior. Compare People v. Aldrich, 849 P.2d 821, 824-25
(Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding conduct, as used within term prior sexual conduct, includes voluntary and involuntary conduct), and State v. Wright, 776 P.2d 1294, 1297-98 (Or. Ct. App. 1989)
(defining conduct includes "volitional or non-volitional" behavior as applied within term past
sexual conduct), with State v. Besk, 640 A.2d 775, 777 (N.H. 1994) (stating rape shield law definition of sexual activity requires consensual conduct), and State v. Markle, 823 P.2d 1101, 1109
(Wash. 1992) (determining past sexual abuse not prior sexual activity because not volitional), and
Lemacks v. State, 427 S.E.2d 536, 537 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (resolving that when victim unwilling
to commit prior behavior such evidence not within meaning of past sexual behavior).
98 See in/ia notes 99-100 and accompanying text (describing bright line classification of
sexually transmitted diseases and false accusations of rape).
99 See, e.g., Murrell v. Ricks, 627 S.E.2d 546, 547 (Ga. 2006)
(considering evidence that victim tested positive for Trichomonas within definition of sexual conduct under Georgia rape shield
law); Fells v. State, 207 S.W.3d 498, 501-02 (Ark. 2005) (considering victim's HIV status under
Arkansas rape shield law's definition of sexual conduct); Cecil v. Commonwealth., No. 2002-SC0252-MR, 2003 WL 22975018, at *4 (Ky. Dec. 18, 2003) (considering evidence of victim's venereal disease within definition of sexual conduct under Kentucky rape shield law); see also
Johnson v. State, 538 S.E.2d 766, 769 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (considering evidence of victim's Caesarian section birth within definition of past sexual behavior under Georgia rape shield statute);
Carmichael, 727 P.2d at 925 (noting presence of venereal disease indicates sexual conduct).
oo See. e.g.,
State v. Baker, 679 N.W.2d 7, 9-11 (Iowa 2004); State v. West, 24 P.3d 648,
654 (Haw. 2001); State v. Thompson, 533 S.E.2d 834, 841 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000). See generally
Grant v. Demskie, 75 F. Supp. 2d 201, 209-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussing majority and minority
views that include and exclude, respectively, victim's prior rape and prior sexual abuse as sexual
conduct under varying rape shield laws). When a past allegation of sexual conduct is held to be
false, the sexual conduct did not actually occur. Baker, 679 N.W.2d at 10. Substantiated allegations or past rape convictions are, however, classified as past sexual behavior in the majority of
jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
State v. Muyingo, 15 P.3d 83, 87 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (holding evidence
that complaining witness was previously raped within meaning of past sexual behavior under
Oregon rape shield law); State v. Jones, 490 N.W.2d 787, 790 (Iowa 1992) (holding term sexual
behavior includes victim's past sexual abuse under Iowa rape shield law). But see State v.
Markle, 823 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Wash. 1992) (citing State v. Peterson, 667 P.2d 645 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1983)) (holding evidence of victim's prior sexual abuse not within rape shield definition of
prior sexual activity).
to]See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text (demonstrating jurisdictions that apply a
narrow interpretation of sexual conduct); supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text (describing
jurisdictions that apply a broadened definition of sexual conduct).
97
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dictions developed two diverging schools of thought.10 2 The first interpretation of sexual conduct was narrowly construed, centering on the need for
actual, physical contact between the victim and another individual. 0 3 The
Court of Appeals of Ohio articulated this view in State v. Barnes10 4 when
admissibility of the victim's dating history under the Ohio rape shield statute was at issue. 05 The court interpreted the term "sexual activity" as
physical, sexual behaviors, and explicitly listed the included physical
acts. 0 6 Reasoning followed that the victim's dating history was not physical behavior and subsequently not governed by the Ohio rape shield statute. 107
Similar to Barnes, the 1993 case of People v. Jones ° 8 examined
the term sexual conduct as it applied to an Illinois rape shield law exception. The exception allowed admissibility of sexual conduct between the
victim and the defendant in contradiction of the general evidentiary limitation.' O9 The Jones court reasoned that "some physical interaction" between
the victim and defendant was necessary to constitute sexual conduct and
held, therefore, that voyeurism was not within the definition of sexual con-

102

See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text (presenting jurisdictions that follow nar-

row interpretation of sexual conduct to require physical behavior); supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text (describing jurisdictions that apply a broad interpretation of sexual conduct).
103 See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text (discussing Barnes and like cases that
exemplify a narrow interpretation of term past sexual conduct).
104 No. 04AP-1133, 2006 WL 1515325 (Ohio Ct. App. June 28, 2005).
105 State v. Barnes, No. 04AP-1 133, 2006 WL 1515325, *6 (Ohio Ct. App. June 28, 2005)
(describing defendant's argument that victim's dating history is excluded evidence under Ohio
rape shield statute and therefore inadmissible).
106 Id. at *7 (emphasizing physicality requirement of definition of "sexual activity" as used
within Ohio rape shield statute). The Barnes court gave a lengthy, comprehensive explanation of
their physicality requirement:
Sexual activity [as used within the Ohio rape shield statute] is defined as sexual conduct or sexual contact or both. Sexual conduct includes vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus. Sexual contact includes any touching of an erogenous zone of another for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person.
Id.; see also In re Johnson, 573 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (holding that evidence of
victim's sexual desires were outside definition of sexual activity under state rape shield statute).
In the 1992 case of State v. Jones, the Court of Appeals of Ohio revisited evidence of a victim's
sexual desires. State v. Jones, 615 N.E.2d 713 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992). While the Jones Court
cited In re Johnson, the analysis sidestepped interpretation of the term sexual activity and instead
referred to evidentiary relevance or lack thereof. Id. at 719-20. The Jones Court held that evidence of the victim's sexual desires was irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. Id. at 720.
107 Barnes, 2006 WL 1515325, at *7.
... 636 N.E.2d 604, 608-11 (111.
App. Ct. 1993).
109 People v. Jones, 636 N.E.2d 604, 610 (111.
App. Ct. 1993) (holding that voyeurism is not
within statutory definition of sexual conduct because it does not involve "some physical interaction").
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duct.' 0
The second school of thought drastically contrasts the first by interpreting the term sexual conduct to include expressed willingness to engage in physical contact, rather than requiring physical contact itself.'
In
the 2006 case of State v. Alberts, 12 evidence that the victim skinny-dipped
with a third party was considered under the Iowa rape shield law.' ' 3 The
defendant argued that skinny-dipping is "not a claim of prior sexual activity
because no actual sexual contact occur[s].""' 14 The Alberts court reasoned,
however, that under the circumstance skinny-dipping was a sexual activity
because it presented a likely attempt by the victim to engage in physical,
sexual activity at a later time.""
Accordingly, the Alberts court held that
the Ohio rape shield law protected against admissibility of victim's act of
skinny-dipping. 16 A number of other jurisdictions that follow the broader
construction have decided that use of birth control and mode of dress are
within the meaning of past sexual conduct." 7

110 Id.
111See discussion infra notes 112-17 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdictions that do
not define sexual conduct in terms of actual, physical conduct); see also People v. Casas, 226 Cal.
Rptr. 285, 289 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that meaning of sexual conduct includes actual sexual acts as well as an expressed "willingness to engage" in such acts); Wright, 776 P.2d at 129798 (holding that "'past sexual behavior' means a volitional or non-volitional physical act that the
victim has performed for the purpose of the sexual stimulation or gratification of either the victim
or another person or an act that is sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse or sexual contact,
or an attempt to engage in such an act, between the victim and another person.") (emphasis
added); People v. Ivers, 587 N.W.2d 10, 14 (Mich. 1998) (developing a test to determine inclusion of evidence under definition of prior sexual conduct based on "whether the statements do or
do not amount to or reference specific conduct") (emphasis in original). In Tennessee, though the
state rape shield statute provides an unproductive definition of sexual behavior, the 2001 case of
State v. Marsh provided the most expansive interpretation of sexual conduct to date:
The term sexual behavior [as used within the Tennessee rape shield statute] embraces
all types of sexual conduct, including heterosexual and homosexual behavior. It also
deals with sexual intercourse as well as ever other variety of sexual expression. It
may include fetishes as well as pre- and post-intercourse behavior.
State v. Marsh, No. E1998-00057-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 555231, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. May
8, 2000) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
112 722 N.W.2d 402,408 (Iowa 2006).
l113
State v. Alberts, 722 N.W.2d 402, 408-10 (Iowa 2006) (discussing application of Iowa
rape shield law's definition of sexual conduct to victim's act of skinny-dipping).
114Id. at 408 (noting defendant's argument against inclusion of skinny-dipping within meaning of prior sexual activity).
115 Id. at 409. But see State v. Baker, 679 N.W.2d 7, 10 (Iowa 2004) (citing State v. Zaeringer, 280 N.W.2d 416 (Iowa 1979)) (holding evidence of victim's nude photographs not within
definition of sexual behavior under Iowa rape shield law).
116 See Alberts, 722 N.W.2d at 409-10.
117 See In re Adam E., No. C047690, 2006 WL 466592 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2006) (hold-
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V. ANALYZING THE INCLUSION OF MYSPACE WITHIN THE
DEFINITION OF SEXUAL CONDUCT
The protective power of rape shield laws struggles to sustain
strength given rapid changes in the way victims exhibit sexual conduct. 18
Historically, the term sexual conduct referred to a victim's chastity or lack
thereof. 119 Yet, disappearing judicial use of the term chastity evinces its
outdated connotation of sexual conduct. 120 Today's society no longer exists in strict terms of chaste and unchaste behavior,
but rather includes new
21
conduct.
sexual
of
models
and alternative
The current MySpace craze has given way to still newer forms of
sexual conduct as a result of fresh technology, largely unrestricted usage
and anonymity.1 22 Sexual expressions found on MySpace, like sexually
explicit language or nude photograph postings, are widespread.123 The continued upsurge of MySpace popularity will only further the practice of such
behaviors. 124
As time persists, contemporary sexual behaviors presented within
the MySpace forum will undoubtedly face legal inquiry in the realm of rape
shield law. 25 Under current rape trial procedure, once preliminary evidentiary concerns, such as hearsay, relevancy, best evidence and authentication, are addressed, MySpace evidence would be measured against jurisdiction-specific rape shield law.' 26 All rape shield law requires a threshold
ing birth control within meaning of sexual conduct under California rape shield law); People v.
Medina, No. H024634, 2003 WL 23097015, at *6-11 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2003) (affirming
evidence of victim's wearing a t-shirt that read "Player 69" inadmissible as sexual conduct under
California rape shield law).
118See discussion supra Part IV (referring to varying methods of interpreting the term sexual
conduct and varying definitions that result).
119 See supra notes 4-5 (illustrating historical use of term "chastity" in rape cases and regarding rape shield law).
120 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (exemplifying application of rape shield law
to forms of sexual conduct other than sexual conduct).
121 See supranotes 7-8 and accompanying text (presenting alternative forms of sexual behavior considered under rape shield law); supra notes 104-17 and accompanying text (illustrating
contemporary exhibitions of sexual behavior that have been analyzed under rape shield laws of
different jurisdictions).
122 See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (discussing provocative usage of MySpace
that could potentially be classified as sexual conduct within the rape shield context).
123 See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (discussing contemporary behavior exhibited on MySpace that could fall within certain jurisdictional interpretations of sexual).
124See supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text (presenting history of MySpace and its rapidly increasing popularity).
125 See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (exemplifying provocative usage of
MySpace).
126 See discussion supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text (discussing developing eviden-
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finding of sexual conduct. 12' Thus, like traditional evidence, evidence derived from MySpace must first be held as sexual conduct. 2 Unlike traditional behavioral models, however, behavior found on MySpace faces a
less straightforward fit under
existing definitions of sexual conduct because
129
of its novel construction.
All behavior that exists on MySpace is the result of posting, which
30
requires a volitional act of the user and is thus conduct by definition.
Yet, whether a specific instance of MySpace behavior is sexual conduct
varies by jurisdiction.' 31 The definition of sexual conduct depends on the
showing of physical behavior. 132 Under some jurisdictions, such as Ohio
and Illinois, the term sexual conduct requires a showing of physical behavior.' 33 In contrast, other jurisdictions, like Oregon, California, Michigan

and Tennessee, interpret sexual conduct without a requirement of physical
behavior, allowing134evidence that shows an expressed willingness to engage
in sexual conduct.
As an online social-networking tool, MySpace intrinsically lacks
physical behavior.n ' 35 Rather, in the MySpace environment the only physical behavior exists between the user and computer hardware. 36 Thus, in
jurisdictions that narrowly construe sexual conduct to require physical sexual behavior, MySpace evidence will be categorically denied from rape

tiary procedure for admitting electronic evidence at trial).
127 See supra note 78 and accompanying text (noting all evidence governed by rape shield
law must first be deemed sexual conduct).
128 See supra note 78 and accompanying text (noting all evidence governed by rape shield
law must first be deemed sexual conduct); supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (explaining
procedure of comparing electronic and non-electronic evidence to determine admissibility at
trial).
129 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (describing method by which MySpace
users "post" information onto MySpace profiles).
130 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (detailing definition of posting as it pertains to MySpace).
131 See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdictions that narrowly
interpret meaning of sexual conduct); supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdictions that broadly interpret meaning of sexual conduct).
132 See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text (giving detail to jurisdictional interpretation of sexual conduct that require physical behavior); supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text
(giving detail to jurisdictional interpretation of sexual conduct that allow "willingness to engage").
133 See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text (explaining narrow interpretations of sexual conduct used by some jurisdictions, including Ohio and Illinois).
134 See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text (explaining broad definition of sexual
conduct used by some jurisdictions when applying rape shield law).
135 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (discussing act of posting information onto
MySpace profiles).
136 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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shield protection. 37 Alternatively, in jurisdictions that define sexual conduct to include an expressed willingness to engage in sexual conduct,
MySpace evidence38 will be analyzed alongside more traditional models of
sexual behaviors. 1
VI. INCLUDING THE NEXT GENERATION OF SEXUAL CONDUCT
The founding premise and succeeding objectives of rape shield
laws are of great importance to the protection and empowerment of rape
victims. Yet, when intimate evidence of a victim's past sexual conduct is
left for interpretation under inconsistent and outdated definitions of sexual
conduct, the good intentions of rape shield laws lose worth. As of the writing of this note, sexual conduct has dozens of definitions ranging from redundant, legislatively prescribed language to contradictory case law doctrine. While the courts haphazardly search for a comprehensive solution,
rape shield laws straddle the line between value and ineffectiveness. And,
with the daily introduction of new models of past sexual conduct, such as
those found on MySpace, the already quaking law may fail its purpose altogether.
Moving forward, it is necessary for all jurisdictions to revise current definitions of past sexual conduct by including a victim's expressed
willingness to engage in sexual conduct. Behavior found on MySpace and
like internet environments is inherently non-physical, but rather illustrative
behavior in the form of words, imagery and sounds. By updating the definition of sexual conduct to include non-physical sexual conduct, behavior
existing on MySpace would be protected by rape shield law alongside traditional models of sexual conduct. Otherwise, all behavior found on
MySpace would categorically fall outside the protective reach of rape
shield law. In today's society, where individuals increasingly rely on
MySpace to develop primary networks of communication and selfexpression, unconditionally ignoring all such behaviors is short-sighted
and, more importantly, ruinous to the purpose of rape shield law.
Leah DaSilva

137 See discussion supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text (giving detail to narrow interpretation of sexual conduct by some jurisdictions that require physical behavior).
138 See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdictions where finding of
sexual conduct requires expressed willingness to engage in sexual conduct and not strictly physical behavior).

